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Healthcare systems around the world are characterized by a suboptimal 
delivery of healthcare services. There has been a growing belief among 
policymakers that many deficiencies (e.g., in the quality of care) stem 
from flawed provider payment systems creating perverse incentives 
for healthcare providers. In several countries this has led to reforms 
based on pay-for-performance (P4P), a payment approach in which 
healthcare providers receive explicit financial incentives to improve the 
quality and efficiency of care. Over the past decade, P4P has attracted 
widespread interest, with programs being uncritically implemented 
in many countries. In contrast to what this interest suggests, however, 
to date P4P does not appear to have been very effective in delivering 
the desired improvements. Moreover, several unintended effects have 
been demonstrated. In part, these disappointing results may well 
have been due to the limited knowledge about crucial aspects of the 
design and implementation of P4P. By identifying and analyzing these 
aspects, synthesizing empirical literature on (unintended) effects of 
P4P, and addressing important empirical questions about performance 
measurement, this thesis aims to provide insight in key conceptual and 
practical issues in the design and implementation of P4P for healthcare 
providers.
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